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The New “Old” Approach to the 
Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In the practice of the conduct of the economic appraisal or cost-benefit analysis of 
projects and programs in the public sector, the approach of defining the economic 
opportunity cost of capital (EOCK) as a national parameter has become widely used.  
This approach estimates the real (or inflation-adjusted) opportunity cost of capital as a 
weighted average of the economic value of the forgone domestic investments and the 
economic cost of additional domestic and foreign savings supplied to the economy as a 
result of the capital markets responding to a project using more capital funds over some 
future long time horizon.1   This approach has had the strength of encouraging the use of 
one EOCK for all public sector project selection.  It simplifies communication, control 
and calculation of the EOCK within the public sector of a country.  As long as the bulk of 
projects that are being evaluated are not self-financing (ultimately paid for by the 
revenues their services generate as in the private sector), but rather are financed out of the 
general revenues, this approach appeared sound as the marginal funds for these projects 
arguably are sourced through the government going to the capital markets for added 
public sector borrowing.    
 
 The criticisms of the national parameter approach primarily focus on the lack of 
risk adjustment of the single EOCK for the differential costs of risk of a project on the 
economy, thereby either penalizing less risky projects or favoring more risky ones.  The 
EOCK as a single national parameter has come under greater pressure of criticism as 
more governments have decentralized public sector investments. This results in greater 
private sector involvement in the risks and returns from public sector investment through 
various partnership and regulatory approaches that include private investment in public 
sector ventures.  The criticism also predated the growth in recent decades of the public 
private partnership approach to the extent that governments were investing in commercial 
ventures, actively or passively, or were taking decisions to affect the viability of 
commercial businesses through guarantees, regulations or tax preferences.  At the same 
time, in the field of corporate finance, models and methods used to identify and measure 
risk premiums have developed and become more widely used.   This led to the realization 
that the variation in the size of risk-adjusted discount rates for investments in different 
sectors and countries was large and a significant, and often dominant, factor in evaluating 
investments. 
 
                                                 
1
 The issues of the appropriate approach to estimating the EOCK in this note is purely with in the context of 
the “Harberger” framework for the conduct of cost-benefit analysis of investment project – the weighted 
average economic opportunity cost measured in domestic currency units as the accounting numeraire.  It is 
not raising any of the issues of other frameworks using other numeraires such as consumption values.  See 
for example, GP. Jenkins and AC Harberger, “Manual on Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment Decisions” 
Chapter 12 for different discount rates applied in different analysis frameworks. 
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 While these criticisms of the national parameter approach have been recognized 
for some time, the difficulty in moving away from this single-value EOCK has been as 
much a practical estimation difficulty as a conceptual one.  What is a feasible method to 
correct the EOCK for the risk and other characteristics of the particular project?  
  
This paper presents a new approach to estimating the EOCK in a country for a 
specific project that can be readily adopted and is consistent with and even strengthens 
the overall framework for undertaking the appraisal of public sector projects and 
programs.  The new approach will also be shown to be “old” in that it uses techniques 
that have been adopted over recent decades at the advocacy of Professor Harberger for 
dealing with similar problems in the estimation of the economic opportunity cost of labor 
where market wage rates are affected by job-related risks as well as other differentials 
arising from job and location specific conditions.  It will also provide a formulation of the 
EOCK that is consistent with the general approach to economic pricing: namely, any 
economic price equals the market price plus externalities.   The note first lays out the 
issues that cause concern with the single national parameter, second discusses the 
alternative approaches, third gives the suggested approach and discusses it application in 
different situations, and finally shows its strengths in improving the distributional 
analysis of investment projects. 
 
2. Issues with a single-valued EOCK   
 
 There are three issues that raise concerns with the national parameter or single-
valued EOCK: 
  
Costs of risk of project 
The first and largest in magnitude, as already mentioned above, is the lack of risk 
adjustment for the risk factors related to a specific project, particularly the systematic 
market or sector risk in the case of self-financing projects.2   The lack of appropriate 
costing of risk can result in either overestimating the economic value of a high-risk 
project or undervaluing a low risk project.  It is noted that the typical estimate of the 
EOCK excludes the costs of risk on the incremental savings (except country risk on 
foreign savings), but includes the risk premiums implicit in the forgone product of capital 
investments displaced.  This means that the typical EOCK contains some element of 
market risk such that it overcharges less risky public sector projects in situations where 
most of the capital is ultimately drawn from forgone investments. 
 
 Transactions cost of supplying capital to project 
 A second issue, but usually of less consequence, is the issue of the differential 
transactions costs in raising capital for a project.  Raising capital has mobilization costs 
that are contained in the market costs of capital.  To the extent that a project has markedly 
higher transaction costs implicit in its costs of capital, as would typically be the case in 
                                                 
2
 Self-financing projects are projects where the revenues from sale of the project services are adequate to 
cover the full costs of the project over its life.  This includes private or commercial ventures or regulated 
utilities or infrastructure projects funded out of user charges, irrespective of whether the project receives 
tax assistance or some public subsidy.  In such cases the revenues will be subject to demand risks and 
possible real price fluctuations. 
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projects financed by the micro-finance sector, for example, then using an EOCK that 
assumes these costs have not been incurred by the economy over states the value of the 
project.  For most large scale projects, the differentials in the costs of capital may be 
closer to the market average except where large upfront expenditures may be required to 
organize project finance arrangements.   In such cases, however, these soft costs may be 
built into the upfront capital investment cash flow costs and not be captured in a cost of 
capital premium.   While these transaction cost differentials may typically be of less 
consequence, the new approach is designed to capture them.3 
 
 Distribution of gains and losses in economy 
 The third issue that arises from a national parameter EOCK is in the context of 
conducting the distributional analysis of a project.   Conceptually, the net present value of 
an investment from an economic perspective captures the aggregate net gain or loss 
experienced by all stakeholders in the project.  The distributional analysis identifies these 
gains and losses to the stakeholders.  The financiers of a project are always key 
stakeholders and the gain or loss that they expect is the NPV based on their weighted 
average risk-adjusted discount rate.  At the same time the capital invested in the project 
needs to generate positive externalities to offset the externalities forgone by the economy 
by investing capital in this particular project.  When the EOCK does not capture the costs 
of risk and transaction costs actually born by the financiers, then the difference between 
their cost of capital and the EOCK does not capture properly the externalities forgone by 
the project that need to be offset by the project externalities.   For example, if the real 
private cost of capital is 15%, say, because of high risk and capital mobilization costs, 
this cost may exceed a national EOCK of 11%, say, which contains the tax and other 
externalities incurred by the economy.  The meaning of the difference between the 
private and economic costs of capital is then not clear.  This issue will be returned to 
again once the new method has been discussed further below.         
 
3. Two approaches to adjusting the EOCK 
 
 Two approaches can be taken to adjusting an economic price when market prices 
differ because of compensating differentials for risk, transaction costs and other related 
features between two market situations as often occurs in labor and capital markets.  For 
example, the market wages at the factory gate for two jobs may differ because of 
different risks inherit in doing the two jobs, or the relative attractiveness of the different 
work or location conditions, or the different costs of commuting to the two jobs, and so 
on.  Similarly, the costs of capital can vary between financial investment opportunities 
because of differences in risks or capital mobilization costs.   In labor markets, one 
approach to estimating the economic cost of labor is to systematically make adjustments 
for all the differential conditions plus the fiscal externalities (taxes, and unemployment 
and social security contributions and benefits) between the new jobs and jobs from which 
labor is sourced.   
 
                                                 
3
 Note that the focus here is on transaction cost differentials within a country.  Large transaction cost 
differentials exist between countries reflecting the technical efficiency and regulatory cost differences 
between the capital markets of countries.  Much of these differentials are often captured as part of the 
country risk premium of a particular country relative to the least risky countries. 
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The second and more elegant approach to estimating the economic opportunity 
cost of labor is referred to as the supply price of labor approach.   See for example, 
Harberger (1972)4 and Jenkins and Harberger, Chapter 13.5    In this approach, the 
competitive market gross wage rate for the new project job is taken as the starting point.  
As long as this market wage can be taken as the wage rate that is just sufficient to attract 
workers to the new job, it must offset all the compensating differentials between the new 
job and labor market alternatives internalized in the workers decisions.  If it is a riskier 
and more unattractive job, then the higher wage rate required to attract workers should be 
just sufficient to offset these added costs of the job.  By contrast, if the job has more 
attractive features the minimum wage rate required to attract workers may be lower than 
those in the alternatives.   The minimum supply wage therefore offsets for all the 
different features between jobs and leaves workers indifferent between them.   Hence, a 
lower supply wage can be taken as economically equivalent to forgoing a higher paying 
job because of the compensating differentials between the jobs.  To get the economic 
costs of hiring workers into the new job, the supply price approach takes this minimum 
supply wage and then adjusts it for the fiscal differentials (or tax, unemployment and 
social security differentials) between the project job and the alternative jobs from which 
workers are ultimately sourced.  Another way of stating this economic cost of labor is 
that it is the minimum or competitive supply wage plus the economic externalities. 
 
In the capital markets, the first approach of making all the adjustments for 
compensating differentials plus other externalities could be followed.   This requires 
subtracting out all the cost of risk saved on investment forgone and adding them to the 
added savings induced into the market plus the added costs associated with the specific 
project financed.  One such approach is to derive a weighted average EOCK removing 
the systematic risk saved on the forgone investments and adding back the systematic risk 
associated with the project.  This approach leads to a “risk adjusted” national EOCK to 
which the systematic risk has to be added.6  It is not entirely satisfactory as it does not 
deal with the full range of costs of risk or capital mobilization costs associated with a 
project. 
 
The second approach of the minimum supply price plus externalities holds more 
promise of generality, flexibility and practicality.   As with the economic opportunity cost 
of labor, the minimum supply price in capital markets is the minimum cost of capital 
required in a competitive market by the financiers of the investment project.  This 
minimum required rate of return by financiers would adjust for all the differential costs of 
risk and capital mobilization that would make them indifferent between financing the 
project and alternative investments in the economy and withdrawing their savings from 
the capital market of the economy.   Hence, it implicitly captures all the compensating 
                                                 
4
 Arnold C. Harberger, Project Evaluation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1972), Chap 7, “On the 
Social Opportunity Cost of Labor.” 
5
 G.P. Jenkins and AC Harberger,  Manual on Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment Decisions,  Chapter 13, 
“The economic opportunity cost of labor”  
6
 This approach is discussed in G. Glenday, “Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital: Financing 
Infrastructure in Emerging Markets”,  a paper prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank , June 
2003 (mimeo)  
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differentials for the specific project without explicitly having to analyze and account for 
them.  On the other hand, in the case of a long run investment, given the general 
fungibility of funds over the long run, the externality associated with the long run 
investment of capital in an economy can be taken to be more a function of the 
characteristics of the economy rather than the project itself.  Hence, the externality per 
unit of capital invested over the long run can be thought of as a national parameter.  This 
approach to estimating the EOCK captures the specific characteristics of the project 
financed as well as the general externalities arising from the long run use of capital funds 
by the project.  The EOCK then differentiates between non-self financing projects, which 
are financed by general government revenues, and self-financing projects in different 
sectors of the economy and the other project-specific characteristics that may cause added 
costs to the financiers.  At the same time, explicit recognition is made of the externalities 
arising from using capital funds.  The formulation is also consistent with the general 
specification of economic prices, namely, they are the sum of the financial or market 
prices of the project plus externalities per unit. 
    
4. Simple derivation and specification of EOCK 
 
  The supply price approach can be seen to be consistent with the standard 
economic pricing model in competitive markets with a single price, that is, markets that 
contain no compensating differentials for the market good or resource traded.  Consider a 
capital market with all costs of capital equal to a single market interest rate, im.7  Capital 
investments are subject to a uniform income tax on their returns at tax rate tc such that all 
investments have to generate a gross-of-tax return on investment of pic = im/(1- tc ).  If im 
= 7% (real or inflation-adjusted rate) and tc =25%, pic =9.33%.  On top of this gross-of-tax 
return the products of capital investment yield indirect taxes that have to be paid for by 
the consumers or users of the products.  These indirect taxes become part of the economic 
return on the investment so that the gross return on investments becomes  
pi = im/(1- tc) (1+ ti) where ti  is the effective indirect tax rate expressed relative to the 
gross-of-tax return on investment.8  If ti  = 15.4%, then pi = 10.77%.  Alternatively, this 
gross return to the economy could be expressed as pi = (im+ td), where td is the tax 
generated per unit of capital invested or td = im (tc + ti)/(1- tc ).  For the parameter values 
in this example, td = 2.33% + 1.43% = 3.77%.  Savers in this capital market are willing to 
supply capital based on their net-of-tax returns or r = im (1- tp) where tp is the income tax 
rate charged on personal savings. If tp = 15%, then r =5.95%. Alternatively, this can be 
expressed as r = (im- ts), where ts is the tax generated per unit of capital saved or ts = im tp 
= 1.05%.  The EOCK of the capital used by a project under the standard weighted 
average formulation is the economic cost of share of capital coming from forgone 
investments, where ω d is the share from forgone investments that would have earned pi, 
                                                 
7
  All interest rates are expressed here on a real or inflation-adjusted basis. 
8
 An estimate of ti can be gained from the share of indirect taxes attributed to capital 
((VAK/TVA)*(Indirect Tax)) relative to the net-of-depreciation value added earned by capital (NVAK)  or 
ti = ((VAK/TVA)*(Indirect Taxes))/NVAK = VAK/NVAK*(Indirect Taxes)/TVA =  (pic + δ)/pic ∗(Indirect 
Taxes)/TVA  where δ = depreciation rate and TVA = total value added or GDP at factor cost.  If  (Indirect 
Taxes)/TVA = 10%,  δ = 5%, and pic =9.33%., then ti =  15.4%  
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and the economic cost of the share coming from savings, where ω s = (1- ω d) is the share 
from added savings at the cost r, or  
 
  
)(
)()(
)1(
1
1
s
s
d
d
m
sm
s
dm
d
pm
s
c
i
m
d
sd
tti
titi
ti
t
ti
rEOCK
−++=
−++=
−+
−
+
=
+=
ωω
ωω
ωω
ωpiω
   (1) 
 
The expressions for the EOCK in (1) above show the equivalence of different 
ways of expressing the EOCK given the assumptions about the capital market in the 
economy made above.  The initial expression of ω dpi + ω sr, or the weighted average of 
the economic value of the forgone product of capital and the cost of additional savings 
supplied characterizes the traditional approach to estimating EOCK as a national 
parameter.  Taking ω d = 0.75, then EOCK = 0.75*10.77% +0.25*5.95% = 9.6%.  The 
final equivalent expression of (im+ω dtd + ω s(-ts)) gives the same value of EOCK, or 
EOCK = 7% +(0.75*3.77% + 0.25*-1.05%) = 7%+ 2.6% = 9.6%, but breaks out the 
components in a different way that are important both from an estimation point of view 
and from a “reinterpretation” of the meaning of the components of the EOCK to allow for 
the direct re-entry of issues of the costs of risk and transaction costs back into the 
estimation of the EOCK.  Importantly, the final expression breaks out the private market 
cost of capital or interest rate from the economic externalities of using capital in a project.  
In addition, the two components are expressed as a rate per unit of capital – in the simple 
example, 7% for the private market cost of capital and 2.6% as the economic externality 
per unit of capital, which, in this simple case, represents the net forgone taxes in the rest 
of the economy by using the capital in the particular project under consideration.  The 
proposed new approach focuses on each component separately, namely, the minimum 
required rate of return by the investors and the economic externality. 
 
Minimum required private rate of return  
First, the assumptions above assume that all capital is the same and earns the 
same return or costs the same per unit.  This is clearly a gross over simplification of 
capital markets that mobilizes capital at varying costs and invests across many 
investments with varying costs of risk arising from a variety of factors: liquidity of the 
investment, inflation and exchange rate or currency risk, industry or systematic risk, 
project specific risk and country risk.  All these risk factors result in persistent and large 
differences in rates of return across investments and countries.  At the same time any 
particular investment is typically financed by a set of different financiers through 
different types of debt and equity instruments that bear different shares of the risk 
inherent in the project.  In a competitive market, it is expected that suppliers of capital, 
both domestic and foreign, will seek the highest returns on supplying capital to 
investments with a given risk characteristics, while project owners or sponsors will be 
seeking the lowest cost of capital and will seek out the lowest cost of mix of capital.  In a 
competitive market, on the marginal investment we expect the return and the cost of 
capital to converge.  In addition, we expect all the players in the market to be reallocating 
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their investments across all the investment opportunities to their own net benefit given 
the returns and risks perceived across all investment opportunities.  Hence, when a new 
project is brought into the market to be financed, existing financiers have to make their 
judgments about the risk characteristics of the new project and how it fits into their 
portfolios, and based on this, decide upon how they trade off the new with existing 
investment opportunities.  Hence, they decide upon the minimum returns they require 
from the new project for different types of debt and investment instruments available to 
invest in the new project.  The importance of this competitive private capital market 
assumption is that this trade-off and pricing process results in investors internalizing or 
taking into account all the risk and transaction cost differentials between the new and 
existing investment opportunities.   Hence, the minimum price of capital that private 
investors require to be willing to supply capital to a project, takes into account the costs 
of investing in the particular project and leaves them at least as well off as investing in 
the alternative opportunities.  From an economic perspective, this allows the minimum 
supply price of capital terms to capture the economic cost borne by the private investors 
including differentials in the costs of risk and transactions.             
 
 The implications of the above are that the competitive or minimum required rate 
of return becomes the first component of the EOCK and this component captures the 
added costs of risk and transaction costs of supplying capital to the project.  Importantly, 
from an economic perspective, the capital invested is the total capital investment.  The 
relevant cost of capital is therefore the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) where 
all the components are being priced at their minimum supply prices.   For a project being 
financed in a competitive market the actual WACC 9 can be used in the EOCK.  This 
includes an estimate of the minimum required return by equity holders, which may 
require some sophisticated or difficult estimate of the cost of equity for projects outside 
of well developed capital markets.   There are four cases that should be noted where the 
interpretation of im as the competitive WACC needs some added considerations: 
  
a. If capital funds are raised by the project in a non-competitive situation 
(possibly a regulated market or non-arms length investment) such that the 
whole or parts of the WACC are above the minimum required by private 
investors in a competitive market, then the price premiums should be removed 
from the WACC in the economic and financial analyses, unless the higher 
costs of capital arise from added risk or transaction cost incurred by the 
specific investors.  In the former case, the financiers gain a windfall, but in the 
latter, the economy loses by the added costs of uncompetitive financing.  This 
case is elaborated on below in the distributional analysis.   
b. If part of the capital funds are subsidized or at concessional rates, then 
unless these are external funds that are completely tied to the particular project 
(they have no possible alternatives available or uses in the economy), the 
subsidy element should be added back into the WACC in the economic 
analysis, but not in the financial analysis.  In the distributional analysis, this 
                                                 
9
 Note that WACC here includes the full or gross-of-tax interest rates.  It is not adjusted for any tax shield 
from tax deductibility of interest expenditures which are already taken into account in the cash flows. 
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will be recognized as a transfer to the project owners from the payers of the 
subsidy (typically the government). 
c. If the project is financed by and wholly owned by a government such that 
the marginal capital finance is coming from the general budget, then aside 
from the considerations in “b” where a share of the investment is financed 
with a concessional loan, the financial opportunity cost of capital for a 
government investment is taken as the long-term borrowing cost of the 
government which would contain the country risk premium on sovereign debt.  
The economic opportunity cost of such budget financed projects would 
effectively become the long-term borrowing cost of the government plus the 
economic externality of capital.  This implies an effectively constant EOCK 
for budget financed public sector projects.  Where the government is 
assuming large risks relative to the size of its resources, however, then project 
risk premiums should also be included or the cash flows adjusted to reflect 
these risks. 
d. If a public sector project receives user charges, then a market systematic 
risk (beta) premium should be included in the minimum supply price of 
capital.  As beta’s are typically estimated for the cost of equity, the equity beta 
should be adjusted for (i) the share of equity financing or (1-d), where d is the 
share of debt financing to obtain an asset beta, and (ii) the share of the total 
cost covered by the user charge or u, or the share of the market premium 
included should be (1-d)uβ, where β is the equity beta for the type or sector of 
the project.   For pure budget financed projects, then u=0 and case “c” above 
occurs, whereas for fully commercialized projects, u=1 and the full premium 
for systematic risk becomes included. 
  
Economic externality per unit of capital 
The second component of the EOCK is the aggregate economic externality arising 
from the use of capital funds in the project.  From an economic perspective, the capital 
funds used by a project come from three basic sources.  A share of the capital is sourced 
from forgone investments (ω d) as the market cost of capital increases; and shares from 
increased domestic savings (ωds) and from increased foreign savings (ωfs) in response to 
higher market returns.  Compared to the simple assumptions presented in (1) above it is 
recognized that within these sources of capital are market segments with different degrees 
of responsiveness to changes in the rates of return and that different segments face 
different tax rates.   The estimation of these weights and the different tax and other 
distortions essentially follows the same logic and methodology as used in the traditional 
estimates of EOCK as shown in the first expression in (1) above, except that here the 
externalities are separated out from the economic returns of forgone investments and 
economic costs of the added domestic and foreign savings.  The unbundling of the 
externalities in some situations simplifies and some complicates estimation of the 
externalities, but importantly once an estimate has been made of the economic 
externalities it can be considered as a national parameter.  While different investment 
projects generate different risks and different investment instrument bear different 
amounts of risk, given the long-run fungibility of money and the interconnectedness of 
capital markets, that aside from the differential premiums that are paid for using capital in 
different uses, the long run response of the economy to removing marginal capital funds 
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into a project is independent of the use of the funds.   This means that the economic 
externality per unit of capital from using capital funds can be regarded as a national 
parameter.   Given this is an external cost suffered by the economy, the use of the funds 
in the project needs to earn internal and external surpluses sufficient to offset this loss.  
This balance is discussed further in the distributional analysis below. 
 
The estimation of the economic externality per unit of capital needs to follow the 
same structure as the traditional estimation of the EOCK except the focus is only on 
adding up the net economic externalities arising from using capital funds over the long 
term.  The added savings are drawn from different sources, Si, which is the existing value 
of savings of that type that responds to increasing returns according to a long-run (or 
stock adjustment) price elasticity of supply, siε .  Savings could be drawn from national 
sources (personal, corporate and government savings), and from foreign sources as debt 
or equity.  S is the total savings available in the economy.  Similarly, capital is drawn 
from forgone investment in different sectors, Ij, depending upon how responsive 
investment in a sector is to increases in the cost of capital as captured by the long-run (or 
stock-adjustment) price elasticity of demand for investment, djη .   Investment could be 
displaced from private, corporate and non-corporate investment in the primary, secondary 
and tertiary sectors or from public sector investments.  I is the total investment in the 
economy and equals S.  If the externalities in each savings and investment sector per unit 
of capital are ei and ej, respectively, then the EOCK can be expressed as  
(2) 
or 
 
         (3) 
 
Here pimin  is the minimum competitive supply price of capital or WACC of the 
project.   On the demand side, the externality in any sector, ej, allowing for income tax 
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rate, tc, tax-deductible taxes on property values of tprop per unit of capital, and indirect 
taxes earned on the gross-of-tax return on capital at the rate of ti ,10 then the externality 
per unit of capital investment is  
 
 
c
cimciprop
jdj t
ttittt
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++−+
==
1
)()1)(1(
  (4) 
 
Note that here the tax rates in all investment sectors are taken to be equal.  In practice, tax 
rates may vary by sector.  In addition, in some countries, significant monopoly premiums 
may be earned in sectors where entry is regulated or restricted, or some sectors may 
receive significant subsidies either as financial transfers, tax breaks or as underpriced or 
subsidized inputs.  Monopoly premiums per unit of investment would need to be added to 
the unit externality but removed from the supply price of capital, while subsidies per unit 
of investment subtracted from the unit externality generated by a sector.   
 
On the supply side, two major sources of capital are national and foreign savings.  
Taking private savings out of total national savings as being price responsive to returns 
on its investment opportunities, the externality is the tax gain (hence, a reduction in the 
EOCK) or the average return on market investments ( avmr ) multiplied by the effective tax 
rate on these investments (tp).  Foreign savings that is responsive to changes in the 
domestic market returns (these exclude unresponsive capital flows such concessional 
loans to governments or fixed interest rate loans) can generate tax gains to the extent that 
withholding taxes are charged on repatriated funds, but can also generate losses to the 
country to the extent that foreign savers earn higher returns on their infra-marginal 
savings as interest rates rise in the domestic market in response to the added demand for 
capital funds.  The marginal economic cost of foreign capital becomes 
)1)(1( sfwhfm ti εφ+−  where fmi is the market price of foreign savings, wht is the effective 
withholding tax rate, φ  is the price responsive share of foreign savings, and sfε is the 
price elasticity of supply of foreign savings.  Hence, the externality has two parts: a tax 
gain, )( fmwhit− , and the loss of surplus to foreign savers, sfwhfm ti εφ)1( − .   Importantly, 
this externality declines as the price elasticity of foreign savings increases, but at the 
same time, the share of the overall economic externality of using capital that arises from 
the cost of added foreign savings increases.  In an open economy faced by a fixed price 
of foreign savings, this share approaches 100% and dominates the EOCK which in the 
limit becomes )1( whfm ti − , assuming fmi  includes any project-related risks and transaction 
costs.  At the other extreme, in a closed or high risk country, this external cost of foreign 
savings per unit of capital rises as sfε  declines, but its share of the overall externality also 
declines.  In such cases, the externalities related to forgone investments tend to dominate. 
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  With taxes on the capital value of property at the effective rate of tprop and with these taxes being 
deductible from income taxes, the gross-of-income and property tax return earned by investments becomes  
)1())1(( ccpropmc ttti −−+=pi  
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Some hypothetical examples of estimates of the economic externality per unit of 
capital invested are provided below in Table 1 for three countries in different country risk 
ranges.  To estimate the externalities three market WACCs are used at 6% for a very low 
risk country, 9% for a moderate to low risk country, and 12% for a high to very high risk 
country.  For simplicity all countries are assumed to have the same effective tax rates: tc 
=25%, tprop = 0.5%, tp = 15%, wht =5%, and indirect taxes of 10% of total value added. 
11
 
In the investment sectors 85% of investment is taken to be responsive to changes in 
market costs of capital at a price elasticity of demand of -1.   On the savings side, 70% of 
total savings is national savings that is responsive to rates of return with a price elasticity 
of supply of 0.3.  For a high risk country, 20% of foreign savings is responsive to market 
rates of return at a price elasticity of supply of 1; for the moderate risk country, 40% is 
responsive to market rates of return at a price elasticity of supply of 3; and for the very 
low risk country, 60% is price responsive at a price elasticity of supply of 6.  This means 
that high returns to foreign savers result in an externality being earned by foreign savers 
in the high risk country of some 2.3% per unit of capital, but forms only 16% of the 
source of capital or an externality of only 0.4% per unit of capital invested.  By contrast, 
in the very low risk country the foreign savers externality falls to 0.6%, but foreign 
savings form 77% of the source of capital, or 0.4% per unit invested.  The very low risk 
country is taken to have an open capital market that is highly integrated in the global 
capital market making for high international capital mobility in response to changing 
rates of return.  By contrast the high risk country has an open capital market, but is poorly 
integrated into the global capital market causing limited capital mobility.   
 
In the high risk country, tax externalities are a positive 6.6% of forgone 
investments, but are -1.8% from taxes on added national savings and -0.6% on added 
taxes on foreign savings.  The combined tax externality is 4.1% per unit of capital.  In the 
very low risk country, the tax externality on forgone investment is 3.8%, while on added 
national savings, it is -0.9%, and on added foreign savings, it is -0.3% giving a combined 
tax externality of 0.4% per unit of capital invested.   
 
                                                 
11
 Following footnote 8, ti  is 15.01% for a very low risk country, 13.95% for a moderate to low risk 
country, and 13.01% for a high to very high risk country 
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Country risk High/ Very 
High
Moderate/ 
Low
Very Low
Market WAAC 12% 9% 6%
Elasticity of supply of 
foreign savings 1 3 6
Shares of capital from
Investment 67% 38% 18%
National savings 17% 9% 5%
Foreign Savings 16% 53% 77%
Sector externality:
Investment taxes 6.6% 5.2% 3.8%
National savings taxes -1.8% -1.4% -0.9%
Foreign savings taxes -0.6% -0.5% -0.3%
Foreign savers surplus 5.7% 1.1% 0.6%
Tax externality 4.1% 1.6% 0.4%
Foreign savers externality 0.4% 0.6% 0.4%
Economic Externality per 
unit of capital 4.4% 2.2% 0.8%
Table 1.  Hypothetical illustrative examples of estimates of 
Economic Externality per unit of capital
 
 
For the three hypothetical countries, the combined economic externalities are 
4.4% per unit of capital invested in the high risk country, 2.2% in the moderate to low 
risk country and 0.8% in the very low risk country.  This illustrates the importance of 
openness and country risk in determining the economic externality from capital 
investment.   In practice, actual countries will have somewhat different economic, tax and 
capital market structures that will yield their own estimates of the national parameter that 
measures the economic externality per unit of capital invested in projects in the 
country.   This national parameter, however, can also be expected to change over time as 
the economic structure, tax policy, tax effectiveness and capital markets develop and as 
such should be estimated on a prospective basis.    
 
The economic externality from capital investment is then added to the minimum 
supply price of total capital or the minimum competitive WACC of the project, pimin , to get 
the EOCK for the project as in expressions (2) or (3) above to estimate the EOCK as:  
  
capitalofunitperyexternalitEconomiciEOCK p += min  (5) 
 
The minimum supply price of capital to the project ( pimin ) will capture the country 
risk, project risk and industry or market risk premiums and transaction costs in 
mobilizing capital for the project.  If the project is a non-self-financing project, that is it is 
financed out of the general budget revenues, then the supply price of capital would be the 
long-term cost of market borrowing by the government, which would include any country 
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risk premium on sovereign debt.  Where projects are very large relative to the revenue 
capacity of a country, then project risk should also be reflected either in pimin  in the EOCK 
or as risk adjustments to the cash flows.  If a project is self-financing or commercial, then 
the systematic industry risk premium needs to be included in pimin . 
12
   
 
 
5. Implications of new approach to distributional analysis 
 
Distributional analysis is critical to understanding the gains and losses to the 
various stakeholders or parties involved in or affected by the operations of a project.  
Economic analysis aggregates all the winners and losers to give an aggregate net benefit 
or net present value (NPV) for all these stakeholders or interested and affected parties.  
Distributional analysis, by contrast, breaks out the net benefits or NPV of each group of 
stakeholders.  Key stakeholders include the financiers (the equity holders or sponsors and 
the debt holders), government as a tax collector and provider of subsidies, consumers, 
suppliers, labor and other parties positively or negatively affected by environmental 
impacts, as examples. 
 
Distributional analysis typically expands the net economic benefit that is 
internalized in the project accounts to an economic perspective.  It takes the net benefits 
accruing to the debt and equity holders and adds in the external net benefits accruing to 
the government, consumers, and other stakeholders.  On an annual basis the economic net 
benefits (ENB) can be taken to be equal to the financial or private net benefits (PNB) of 
the project plus the sum of all the external costs and benefits, or in any year t: 
 
 ∑+=
i
ittt NBexternalPNBENB ,    (6) 
Given this identity holds in every year, then it holds if all of its components are 
discounted to the present by the same discount rate or EOCK.   In that case the present 
value of the present value of the ENB discounted at the EOCK gives the net present value 
of the project from the economic perspective ( econEOCKNPV ) or  
   
  ∑+=
i
iEOCK
captot
EOCK
econ
EOCK PVExtNPVNPV ,    (7) 
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 Bailey and Jensen (1972) developed a risk-adjusted version of the Harberger weighted-average EOCK 
that is somewhat analogous to the formulation presented here, but also has some fundamental differences.  
Bailey and Jensen proposed an EOCK composed of a risk-free EOCK plus a risk adjustment component 
that reflected the systematic risk of the new investment project.  This formulation results in the capital 
market externalities in the EOCK from the new project absorbing capital funds from other uses being a 
function of the riskiness of the new project rather than being independent of the riskiness of the new 
project.  The new approach presented in this paper separates the foregone externality of using capital funds 
from the riskiness of the new project.  It also allows for a wider range of types of risk and transactions costs 
(not just systematic or market risk) to be recognized in the supply of capital to the new project.  See Bailey, 
Martin J. and Michael C. Jensen, “Risk and the Discount Rate for Public Investment,” in Michael C. Jenson 
(ed.), Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets, New York: Praeger, 1972 
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 The first right-hand side term gives the financial net cash flows to the total capital 
investment discounted by the EOCK  and the second term sums up the external costs and 
benefit flows arising from the project discounted by the EOCK.  Typically, these 
externalities would include the added consumer surplus captured by project beneficiaries 
(particularly in public sector projects delivering services at no or low prices), and the tax 
externalities from the direct taxes paid by the project and the indirect taxes arising from 
the net production of foreign exchange or the net products or services delivered by the 
project.  Now, while this expression for the distribution of the aggregate losses and gains 
is correct and useful in checking the consistency in the overall analysis, it does not show 
the actual gains and losses to certain key stakeholders.   Critically, the actual gains and 
losses of the financiers can only be captured if their actual values are included.  To do 
this (7) is transformed first by adding and subtracting the net present value expected by 
the project financiers from the expected total cash flows of the project discounted by their 
WACC ( captotWACCNPV ).  Initially, assume the financiers are operating in competitive capital 
markets and their WACC is the minimum private supply cost of capital funds, pimin .  
Hence, (7) becomes 
 
 ∑+−+=
i
iEOCK
captot
i
captot
EOCK
captot
i
econ
EOCK PVExtNPVNPVNPVNPV pp ,)(
minmin
 (8) 
 The first right-hand term now captures the actual net benefits (surplus or loss) 
going to the financiers.  What is the meaning of the second term, the difference between 
the same project cash flows from the total capital perspective discounted by the EOCK 
and by pimin ?    From expression for the EOCK in (5) above, this difference in the second 
term measures the forgone economic externalities caused by investing capital in the 
project.  This precise interpretation of this term only arises under the new approach to the 
EOCK that adjusts the EOCK for the costs of risk and capital mobilization transaction 
costs related to the project investment.  It is a useful result as it allows the forgone 
externalities (typically, largely taxes) to be compared with the surplus made by the 
project and the externalities captured by the government (often largely taxes) and by 
consumers and other stakeholders.  For example, in cases where a project gets a tax 
holiday it allows a comparison of this tax forgone by the government (both directly 
through the tax holiday and indirectly by the use of capital) with the surplus captured by 
the project and the direct and indirect tax externalities going to the government.  This 
allows important questions to be answered such as whether the tax holiday was needed by 
the project or whether the government suffers a net loss of tax revenues.  To go further 
and explore the distribution of the gains and losses from a project that provides public 
services at no or low user charges as well as cases where project financiers are not facing 
competitive market conditions (by, for example, having access to low-interest rate debt), 
further expansion of expression (8) is desirable, but before doing that it is useful to gain 
insights into this expression for simple private sector investments.      
 
 Private sector projects 
 Consider an investment of 100 in a commercial project that yields perpetuities of 
6 to the private financiers and direct tax externalities of 4 (all in a constant price terms.)  
The private cost of capital is 6% and the economic externality per unit of capital 
investment is 4% (primarily forgone taxes), and hence, EOCK = 10%.  Clearly, this 
The new approach to EOCK 
 
16
project is marginal from both private and economic perspectives, or 
0%66100 
min
=+−=captoti pNPV  and 0%1010100 =+−=
econ
EOCKNPV .  The private fanciers 
are just indifferent to taking on this marginal investment.   
 
If the distribution of the gains and losses is explored using the consistency 
expression (7), then it is not clear that the private investors actually break-even.  
According to (7),  04040%)10/4(%)10/6100( =+−=++−=econEOCKNPV , whereas 
expression (8) shows that the private investors breakeven, that the economy forgoes 40 in 
externalities by investing 100 in the project, but the project generates 40 in direct tax 
externalities so that the economy also breaks even.   To gain further insights into the 
second term in expression (8) it is useful express this simple investment in more general 
terms. 
 
 Let p equal a private perpetuity captured by the private financiers, ext equal the 
annual direct economic externality generated by the investment, and e gives the rate of 
forgone economic externalities, or piEOCKe min−=  in terms of expression (5) above.  
Now expression (8) for the 100 investment becomes    
 
)/()]/100(/100[)/100( minmin EOCKextipEOCKpipNPV ppeconEOCK ++−−+−++−=
 or 
)/()]/)(/[()/100( minmin EOCKextEOCKeipipNPV ppeconEOCK +−++−=  (9) 
 
Now for a marginal private investment, 100/ min =
pip  or 0 
min
=
captot
i pNPV , then 
 
)/()/100( EOCKextEOCKeNPV econEOCK +−+=    (10) 
 
or the project needs to generate direct externalities (such as added direct taxes) at a rate as 
fast as economic externalities are forgone (or ext/100 ≥  e) for it to be economically 
attractive or 0≥econEOCKNPV .  In the simple example above, the forgone externalities are   
-40 that are offset by the direct externalities generated of 40. 
 
 If the private investors expect to capture a surplus or  0 
min
>captoti pNPV  such that 
100/ min >
pip , then the forgone externalities )/( min EOCK
eip p − increase over those in (10),  
as the economy now loses access to the surplus captured by the private investors.  These 
forgone externalities are offset by both the surplus captured by the private investors and 
the direct externalities.  To illustrate, staying with the same simple investment as an 
illustration, assume that the private perpetuity increases from 6 to 7.2, but otherwise 
generates the same perpetual externality of 4.  From (9), 
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  (11) 
Note that the forgone externalities have increased from -40 to -48, but in this case the 
private gains are 20 and more than offset this increased external loss of 48.  Importantly, 
the external loss on the capital invested increases by the financiers surplus of 20 times the 
externality forgone per unit of capital or 20*4% = 8.   
 
 What if the government offered the marginal investor a tax break that increased 
the private perpetuity by 2.4 from 6 to 8.4, but this tax break cuts the direct annual 
externality generated by the project by the same amount from 4 to 1.6?   Again using (9), 
 
0
)16()56()40(
%)10/6.1()
%10
%4%6/4.8(%)6/4.8100(
=
+−+=
+
−
++−=econEOCKNPV
  (12) 
In this case, the tax break transfers added 40 to the private investors’ gains raising 
captot
i pNPV
 
min
 to 40 at the expense of a loss of direct externalities of 24 (=40 –16)  and 
indirectly losing an added 16 (=56-40) such that econEOCKNPV  is reduced to zero (= +40 – 16 
– 24)).   Note that the added forgone externality on the capital is 40*4% or 16. 
 
   Public Sector Projects 
 In the case of many public sector projects, the project service is delivered at no or 
a low user charge such that from a financial perspective the project is financially 
unattractive and requires significant government subventions from general tax revenues.   
From the economic perspective, the external gains to the users of the service need to be 
high enough to offset the financial losses and any other external net economic losses.   In 
such projects, it becomes important to be able to identify the service beneficiaries and 
how much they gain separately from other externalities, typically due to tax distortions.  
To do this expression (8) is expanded to recognize the net benefits or losses by the 
various external stakeholders as follows:   
 
)()(
,,, minminminmin jij
jEOCK
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ji
captot
i
captot
EOCK
captot
i
econ
EOCK pppp PVExtPVExtPVExtNPVNPVNPVNPV −++−+= ∑∑
           (13) 
 
Here, the first and third right-hand terms capture the actual present value of the gains or 
losses experienced by the financiers and by the external stakeholders, respectively.   The 
second and fourth right-hand terms capture the forgone externalities (mainly tax related) 
arising from the capital investment adjusted for the transfers of surplus between 
stakeholders caused by the project.   
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 A simple water supply project is used as an illustration.  A government water 
agency invests 100 in a water supply project and incurs perpetual annual operating and 
maintenance costs of 10 each year in constant prices.  It supplies the water services free 
of charge such that the gain to the consumers is a perpetual benefit of 25.  This external 
gain forms the first externality.   The operations and maintenance are financed by 
government revenues and the economy suffers the external economic cost of raising these 
public funds annually of 20% of the revenues.13  This results in the second externality of 
a perpetual cost of 2 each year.  This is the loss in market surplus or dead weight loss 
suffered by the private sector as taxpayers.  The private or financial cost of capital ( pimin ) 
is 6%.  With forgone economic externalities of 4%, the EOCK is 10%.   For simplicity 
sake, it is assumed that all the stakeholders have the same discount rate as the project 
financiers.  Table 2 shows this water supply investment project from the financial, 
economic and distributive perspectives.   
 
 Box A of Table 2 gives the regular financial and economic appraisal of the 
project.  It shows that financially, the government-sponsored water agency invests 100 
and incurs perpetual annual costs of 10 to maintain and operate the project.  From a 
financial perspective, the 7.266%610100 
min
−=−−=
captot
i pNPV .     From an economic 
perspective, the 30%10)21025(100 =−−+−=econEOCKNPV . 
 
 Box B of Table 2 applies expression (7) to check the consistency of the analysis.  
The present value at EOCK of the externalities of the project experienced by the 
consumers and private sector as taxpayers amount to (+25/10% -2/10%) or 230, and the 
present value of the costs of the water agency amount to (100+10/10%) or 200, so that 
the difference is the  30200230 =−=econEOCKNPV . 
 
 Box C of Table 2 applies expression (11) to provide the distributive analysis, 
while Box D regroups the gains and losses so as to recognize the actual gains and losses.   
Now, the present value of the actual gain to consumers is 416.7 (which exceeds the gain 
to the economy of 250).  The gain to consumers is reduced by the present values of the 
loss of the private sector from the economic cost of the public funds used to finance the 
operations and maintenance (-33.3), the financial loss of the water supply agency (-
266.7), and the net economic externality forgone through the use of the capital funds 
adjusted for the changes in stakeholder surpluses (+66.7-166.7+13.3=-86.7).  Again, 
these add up to the overall present value of the net economic gain of 30.  Box D also 
presents the distribution of these gains and losses as annualized amounts (rather than 
present values).  The annual consumer gain of 25 is reduced by the economic cost of 
public funds (-2), the rental and operating cost of the water supply agency (-16) and the 
forgone externality on the capital invested (-4) leaving a net economic gain of 3 per year 
(or 30 in present value terms.)  
 
 
                                                 
13
 The marginal economic cost of public funds is taken here to be 20%.   
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Private or financial discount rate (priv) 6%
Economic discount rate (EOCK) 10%
6% 10%
A. Project appraisal
Construction 
period
Operations 
period 
(perpetual) Financial Economic
Benefits
Economic benefit of free water (Ext 1) 25 416.7 250
Costs
Capital cost 100 100 100
Operating and maintenace costs 10 166.7 100
Cost of public funds (Ext 2) 2 33.3 20
NPV consumers (Ext 1) - NPV priv sector (Ext 2) 383.3 230.0
NPV water suppliers (total capital investment perspective) -266.7 -200.0
NPV economic 30
B. Consistency check
NPV total capital at EOCK -200.0
NPV Ext (1+2) at EOCK 230.0
NPV econ at EOCK 30.0
C.  Distribution of gains and losses
NPV water suppliers (tot cap) at priv -266.7
NPV water suppliers (tot cap) at EOCK - same at priv 66.7
NPV consumers (Ext) at priv 416.7
NPV consumers (Ext) at EOCK - same at priv -166.7
NPV priv sector (Ext 2) at priv -33.3
NPV priv sector (Ext 2) at EOCK - same at priv 13.3
NPV econ at EOCK 30.0
D.  Distribution of actual gains and losses
Annual net 
benefits Present values
Consumers (Ext 1) 25 416.7
Private sector (Ext 2) -2 -33.3
Government as sponsor or agency (investor & operator) -16 -266.7
Government as receiver of revenue -4 -86.7
Economy 3 30.0
Present values (PV) at 
Table 2.   Finacial, economic and distributional analysis of a public sector water supply project 
 
       
 
 Uncompetitive financing 
Further refinements can be added to the distributional analysis in cases of 
uncompetitive financing of a project.   Two common situations arise.  The first, and 
possibly more common situation, is that of the project owners or sponsors getting access 
to low-interest rate loans.   Usually, this arises where some national or multi-national 
agency either provides below-market interest rate loans or provides loan guarantees that 
lower interest rates.  The second situation is where the equity holders have above market 
costs of capital.  This may arise where a government is awarding a contract or concession 
in an uncompetitive fashion.    
 
Low interest rate loan 
To analyze the effects of a low-interest rate loan case, the first step is recognize 
the cash flows to total capital are allocated to the different equity and debt holders.  
Typically, where debt is supplied at a competitive market interest rate, it is taken that the 
debt holders just cover their costs and receive zero net present value (or the net present 
value of the debt holders’ cash flows is zero at the interest rate paid on the debt or 
0int =
debtNPV .)  This means that all the residual gains and losses from the project go to the 
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equity holders or equityequity
captot
i NPVNPV p =min , or the net cash flows to the equity holders 
discounted at their discount rate or supply price of equity.14  In the case of a project 
receiving guaranteed, concessional or subsidized debt, however, the project WACC will 
be less than pimin  to the extent of the lower cost of debt.   Hence, expression (8) needs to 
recognize this difference between the actual costs of finance in the WACC and the 
minimum supply price in the EOCK as follows:15 
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(14) 
The first term remains the surplus accruing to the project owners (which is now larger 
because of the subsidized debt).  The second term is negative (WACC < pimin ) as it is the 
value of the low-interest rate debt captured by the equity holders relative to paying 
market interest rates.  The third term remains the forgone economic externalities on the 
capital used by the project.   One of the externalities is now the present value of the 
negative cash flow of the cost arising from the low interest rate loan to the government or 
funding agency bearing the cost of the low interest rate loan.    
 
 A simplified case of a low interest rate loan can be illustrated using the example 
in (11) above of a perpetual investment project except the project is not financially 
attractive to private investors with market financing, but is generating above average 
externalities.  Now p = 5.4, WACC = pimin , and ext = 5, with the same costs of capital such 
that:  
 
                                                 
14
 
equity
equity
captot
i NPVNPV p =min is a useful expression to find the WACC of a project where the structure of 
debt is complex and the debt-equity ratio varies over time.  If equityequityNPV is estimated, then the WACC or  
pimin can be found by finding the value of pimin that would have the same NPV as 
equity
equityNPV  for the net  
cash flows to total capital.  See Graham Glenday and Joseph Tham, “What weights in the WACC?” 
Sanford Institute Working Paper Series, Paper No. SAN03-01 2003 
 
15
 Note that captotWACCNPV in (14) can be disaggregated into the NPVs accruing to the different financiers.  
Assuming two classes of financier, equity and debt holders, and dividing the cash flow to total capital 
between them, then debtdebt
equity
equity
captot
WACC NPVNPVNPV += .  For example, in the case of the perpetuity of 
6 to total capital of 100 at a cost of 6%, if debt receives 1.2 from investing 40 at an interest rate of 3%, 
equity invests 60 and receives the balance of 4.8, then all parties have NPV =0 and WACC is 6%.  Instead 
of adjusting the WACC in (14) for subsidized interest rates or other changes in the private costs of capital, 
if the financiers’ NPVs are disaggregated, then the changes in their net benefits can be accounted for 
directly.  If an external agent (such as a government) is funding the interest rate subsidy, then this external 
cost is also explicitly recognized in the externalities of the project.  The second term in (14) would be 
similarly disaggregated into the NPVs of the different financiers so that it would capture the gain to the 
equity holders and loss to the debt holders relative to paying market interest rates on the debt.   
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Expression (15) shows that the private financiers lose 10, the economy gains 4 from the 
high direct externalities generated by the project relative to those forgone.  Now, the 
government offers a low interest rate loan that costs the government 1.2 each year to 
finance the low-interest rate loan which lowers the externalities from 5 to 3.8 each year.   
With the low interest rate loan and possibly higher leverage, the WACC falls to 4.8%.16  
Expressing (14) in terms of the perpetuity: 
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(16)  
 
Now the equity-holders expect a gain of 12.5 rather than a loss of 10 (or a net 
improvement of 22.5 as shown the second right-hand term), but the economy loses 12 in 
external gains and the externalities drop from 50 to 38 as it has to finance the forgone 
interest of 1.2 a year.17  Note that this lower interest rate could be achieved by the 
government financing the interest loss by tax revenues; or by the government using 
guarantees to some financial institutions to provide the lower cost debt (where the 
expected cost of the guarantee would be draw on government revenues)18; or if the 
government received low interest rate financing from a foreign donor agency, and instead 
of using this to pay off existing debt at market interest rates, it passes on this low rate to 
the investment project and forgoes tax savings or benefits from added expenditures.  It 
would only be in the case of the foreign donor agency providing the low interest rate 
financing for a specific project that could not be used for alternative uses and the funding 
                                                 
16
 Without low interest rate loan, if equity finances 40% at a cost of 9% and debt the remaining 60% at 4%, 
then WACC = 6%.   If the interest rate is lowered to 2% then this costs 1.2 per 100 investment in total 
capital (or 2% * 60% = 1.2%) and the WACC =4.8%. 
17
 A similar net gain could have been passed on to the equity holders of the investment by cutting its tax 
burden by 1.35 per year.   This would also reduce the external gains from the project by 13.5 such that the 
economy suffers a loss of 9.5. 
18
 Estimating the costs and benefits of loan guarantees is fairly complex in two respects.  The gains to the 
beneficiary requires knowledge of what the supply price of a particular risk-class of debt would have been 
in a competitive market to the project, the probable costs of default under the conditions of the guarantee 
and the amounts of these costs recoverable from the guarantor.  The cost to the guarantor becomes these 
expected claims under the guarantee conditions.  
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would not be available for other purposes that the interest loss would not be experienced 
as an externality.  
 
 Uncompetitive equity supply 
  Typically, suppliers of equity are not expected to invest if they do not expect to 
achieve their minimum supply price.  They may, however, expect to receive returns 
above the market minimum supply price or above their own supply price.  This may 
occur where project gets offered an above market return as could happen in a regulatory 
regime guaranteeing a specified return, or where there is a lack of competitive bidding.  
For example, in the case of bidding for a public concession providing access to income-
generating public assets, the government agency may accept a below market bid.  Two 
difficult-to-distinguish situations may arise, namely, either (a) the equity holders except a 
windfall gain ( 0>captotWACCNPV ) even with WACC = pimin , or (b) the actual WACC exceeds 
pimin  because the equity holders only have access to high-cost debt and/or have high cost 
equity (as may be the case with a small undiversified company with risk averse owners) 
such that in the extreme the private bidders are, in fact, only just willing to do the project 
or captotWAACNPV = 0.   In this latter case, arguably the real added costs of capital are being 
incurred by the financiers by allowing above-market-cost capital to be used and following 
(5),  EOCKuc = WACC + economic externality per unit of capital.   At this higher 
EOCK, econEOCKucNPV is lower than 
econ
EOCKNPV  (where EOCK is based on pimin ) and the 
difference ( econEOCKucNPV - econEOCKNPV ) captures the economic loss from uncompetitive 
bidding.   Taking the example in (11) above, if the project generated a private perpetuity 
of 7.2 and externalities of 4, then the private gains are 20 with pimin = 6% and economic 
gains are12 with EOCK =10%.  If investors with a minimum WACC of 7.2% were 
allowed to undertake the project, then EOCKuc  becomes 11.2% (7.2%+4%) and (11) 
becomes    
0
)7.35()7.35()0(
%)2.11/4()
%2.11
%4%2.7/2.7(%)2.7/2.7100(
=
+−+=
+
−
++−=
uc
econ
EOCKNPV
 (17) 
Here the economy loses 12 by allowing high-cost investors to undertake the project.  
Clearly, in (11) competitive bidding could have extracted an upfront transfer of 20 from 
the investors with a WACC of 6% to the government (a direct lump sum externality) and 
left the net economic gains unchanged at 12.  
 
7.  Summary Remarks 
 In summary, the new, but old approach to the EOCK as the minimum or 
competitive supply price of capital to a project plus a national parameter estimate of the 
economic externality per unit of capital is both flexible and feasible.  It unifies the 
insights and techniques coming from the capital market finance experts of the business 
school in estimating the minimum supply price of capital with the economic insights of 
the public finance economist in estimating the economic externalities of using capital.  It 
removes the increasingly weighty criticism of the lack of risk adjustments in the single-
valued EOCK, while it contains the EOCK estimate of the cost of public investment 
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funds for the pure public sector project as a special case.  In the latter case, however, the 
EOCK is likely to be somewhat lower than the traditional single valued estimate as the 
costs of risk and transaction cost included would only be those included in the cost of 
long-term public debt.  Finally, it allows a more precise disaggregating of the gains and 
losses to the project financiers, government treasury, public service beneficiaries and 
other stakeholders of a project for public sector projects and for projects with private 
participation under a variety of tax and capital investment incentive arrangements.  
